Politics

Violent extremism is probably the toughest challenge to not only the Middle East but the entire world, where boundless forms of threats exist. This serious threat, which has so far wreaked huge havoc in Iraq and Syria, has cast its evil shadow on the four corners of the region. That extremism is widespread and that its global practitioners are many have already shown what detrimental impacts it can have on the geopolitical and security environment not just in our region but also in many other areas in the world. The crimes committed thus far by the extremists and their violent efforts aimed at destruction and ethnic cleansing in Syria and Iraq has shocked the world. Terrorist attacks in Europe by cells affiliated with al-Qaeda, what is known as the 2015 Baga massacre by Boko Haram, the terrorist attack in Tunisia’s national museum, the suicide attack against civilians in Afghanistan’s Jalalabad, the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, and the abhorrent massacre of 147 students in Kenya only in the recent months have laid bare more than ever before the proportions of the increasing threat originating from violent extremism. 

This phenomenon first came to attention following the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, which led to the formation of al-Qaeda and Taliban; it took new dimensions with the US invasion of Iraq and the formation of various groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in that country and ultimately the emergence of Daesh. The numerous crimes – such as murders, rapes, forced conversions, torture and slavery – that are shamelessly being propagated by Daesh on social media have laid bare the types and extent of threats posed by the outfit. Recruitments by Daesh from 90 countries worldwide, including from Western industrial “democracies,” is a warning, which speaks to the fact that there are many structural and social disorders. The Takfiri tendencies of this group have allowed it to simply justify raids on an increasing number of social groups and even boast of them (the raids) and target those groups with murder, plunder and slavery.

Their crimes have gone even beyond their initial goals, and have targeted other rival Takfiri groups as well. The moves by the two groups of Daesh and Jibhat al-Nusra to behead members of one another on numerous occasions are indicative of such tendencies in these groups. In one such instance, in March 2014, infighting between the two groups in northern Syria left over a thousand individuals dead. The systematic destruction of historical mosques, holy shrines, ancient gravesites and temples, as well as acts of sacrilege, and the brazen demolition of historical artifacts – signs of the rich cultural heritage of the region – reveal what kind of future these extremists have in mind for the region.

The extensive crimes that were committed against Izadis are indicative of the extremists’ behavior and their evil plans for minorities. The mass murder of 1,700 Iraqi Air Force officers in Tikrit in 2014, and using social media to display these serious crimes and to boast about them showed what kind of future would await the people of Iraq if they failed to defeat these extremists. These acts constitute all-out attacks on the region’s social structure and the rich, diversified and honorable social structure.

Where does violent extremism originate from? Such human values as affection, love for fellow human beings, patience and forgiveness have always been the fundamental components of the message that all religions, especially Islam, have been trying to spread throughout history. Nevertheless, over the past two centuries, a small group of demagogues with suspicious backgrounds and with the pretext of reforming religion, have begun offering a distorted and unreal image of Islam. With political goals and to advance their short-sighted agenda, they made efforts to alter the message of Islam and distort religious teachings and attempted to take affection away from religion. Thus, the Takfiris and their followers took a harsh stance – more than before – toward those who refused to accept such an interpretation of religion, and the former regarded the latter as being “out of religion.”

Based on such unfounded interpretations, they rejected the narratives that diverged from theirs and engaged in takfiring all of those who either held different beliefs or belonged to a different population. They claim they are the only ones who have a right understanding of Islam, and that truth is in their possession in its entirety. Such a viewpoint is the essence of Takfirism; and in my mind, the current challenges in the region and the existing extremism are rooted in that viewpoint. As long as such an interpretation of religion was and is confined to a small group of individuals, these individuals could and can have their own beliefs.

Problem emerged when certain individuals, in possession of wealth and power, took up the task to spread these ignorant interpretations in Islamic countries far and near, and to impose them on people in poor nations through money and propaganda. This time around, the priority of this wealthy and powerful group was no more “religious purity;” rather, their activities were based on certain political goals and a number of short-sighted strategic calculations. Thus, unfortunately, individuals and groups that were susceptible to radical ideologies because of their social and economic conditions were lured.

On the other hand, while the majority of those who believe in Takfiri interpretations have always refrained from resorting to force to spread and enforce their beliefs, some of them took up arms, and in some cases, even rebelled against their own masters. It was exactly at this point where violent extremism was born.

The vicious cycle of foreign intervention, radicalism and regional instability

While it is necessary to investigate the roots of Daesh and Company in the historical trajectory of offering distorted interpretations of Islam, as described above, one should also pay heed to the important role of the bloody developments in Iraq in the past decade in the formation and growth of existing extremist groups, too. Political and military interventions in the Islamic world, particularly in the 2000s, caused many difficulties, provided fertile ground for extremist demagogues, allowed the most radical of them to dominate others and thus, the ground was paved for violent extremist groups to take shape.

Daesh is not a new phenomenon. There is now consensus that violent extremists have exploited the chaos in Iraq during the occupation of the country by the US. A group like Daesh, which feeds on turmoil and chaos, grew thanks to the instability and upheaval that emerged following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Extremists also found opportunities in the Syrian crisis and through the support they received from individuals, circles and governments in the region; they made up some fake cause, and turned into such monsters that they now sometimes even threaten their own masters and supporters.

Their call on the deprived youths in Arab countries following the relative failure of the “Arab Spring” and in Western countries enabled them to strengthen their ranks and grow rapidly. Military intervention and crude efforts aimed at the social engineering of Middle Eastern societies are reflective of the depth of illusions in the policy-making of the US and some other Western powers vis-à-vis the region. What was referred to as the “Greater Middle East Initiative,” and was aimed at the engineering of Middle Eastern societies along social and political lines with the ultimate goal of exporting “democracy” had provided the theoretical framework for military interventions.

This “initiative” prompted intense resistance in the region, and only managed to entail more extensive instability. Those who devised this plan were incapable of understanding that democracy can neither be imposed on a nation through brute force, nor can it take root in a society under the rule of an occupying military. The damage done to Iraq and the region while attempts were being made to enforce this illusory scheme has been so extensive and deep that years of endeavors to undo it have had little effect.

The objective of these policies, that were formed based on utter ignorance toward the innate dynamism of the region, was to impose on it a model completely alien to the region and in contradiction to the traditions, cultures and ways of life of native societies.

The continual instability that befell a number of societies in the region as a result of this process paved the ground for the empowerment of violent extremists, and caused a vicious cycle in which foreign occupation and radicalism fed one another, in such a way that extremists were enabled to exploit the social and cultural gaps that have been caused. Predicting such a scenario was not very difficult.

In a speech in the Security Council in February 2003, I said, “Today, the extent of instability in the region and uncertainty about the future in Iraq is beyond our imagination. Given the conditions of the Iraqi society, and in view of the situation in the entire region, ambiguities abound; and none of the sides can factor in these ambiguities in advance with any degree of certainty. But one outcome is almost certain, that extremism will massively benefit from this irresponsible adventurism in Iraq.”

Today, no one can deny that extremists and terrorists are way more powerful than what their demagogue masters could imagine in 2001, and are operating in more areas in the Middle East.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

11.Aug.2015

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Violent extremism is probably the toughest challenge to not only the Middle East but the entire world, where boundless forms of threats exist. This serious threat, which has so far wreaked huge havoc in Iraq and Syria, has cast its evil shadow on the four corners of the region. That extremism is widespread and that its global practitioners are many have already shown what detrimental impacts it can have on the geopolitical and security environment not just in our region but also in many other areas in the world. The crimes committed thus far by the extremists and their violent efforts aimed at destruction and ethnic cleansing in Syria and Iraq has shocked the world. Terrorist attacks in Europe by cells affiliated with al-Qaeda, what is known as the 2015 Baga massacre by Boko Haram, the terrorist attack in Tunisia’s national museum, the suicide attack against civilians in Afghanistan’s Jalalabad, the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, and the abhorrent massacre of 147 students in Kenya only in the recent months have laid bare more than ever before the proportions of the increasing threat originating from violent extremism. 

This phenomenon first came to attention following the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, which led to the formation of al-Qaeda and Taliban; it took new dimensions with the US invasion of Iraq and the formation of various groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in that country and ultimately the emergence of Daesh. The numerous crimes – such as murders, rapes, forced conversions, torture and slavery – that are shamelessly being propagated by Daesh on social media have laid bare the types and extent of threats posed by the outfit. Recruitments by Daesh from 90 countries worldwide, including from Western industrial “democracies,” is a warning, which speaks to the fact that there are many structural and social disorders. The Takfiri tendencies of this group have allowed it to simply justify raids on an increasing number of social groups and even boast of them (the raids) and target those groups with murder, plunder and slavery.

Their crimes have gone even beyond their initial goals, and have targeted other rival Takfiri groups as well. The moves by the two groups of Daesh and Jibhat al-Nusra to behead members of one another on numerous occasions are indicative of such tendencies in these groups. In one such instance, in March 2014, infighting between the two groups in northern Syria left over a thousand individuals dead. The systematic destruction of historical mosques, holy shrines, ancient gravesites and temples, as well as acts of sacrilege, and the brazen demolition of historical artifacts – signs of the rich cultural heritage of the region – reveal what kind of future these extremists have in mind for the region.

The extensive crimes that were committed against Izadis are indicative of the extremists’ behavior and their evil plans for minorities. The mass murder of 1,700 Iraqi Air Force officers in Tikrit in 2014, and using social media to display these serious crimes and to boast about them showed what kind of future would await the people of Iraq if they failed to defeat these extremists. These acts constitute all-out attacks on the region’s social structure and the rich, diversified and honorable social structure.

Where does violent extremism originate from? Such human values as affection, love for fellow human beings, patience and forgiveness have always been the fundamental components of the message that all religions, especially Islam, have been trying to spread throughout history. Nevertheless, over the past two centuries, a small group of demagogues with suspicious backgrounds and with the pretext of reforming religion, have begun offering a distorted and unreal image of Islam. With political goals and to advance their short-sighted agenda, they made efforts to alter the message of Islam and distort religious teachings and attempted to take affection away from religion. Thus, the Takfiris and their followers took a harsh stance – more than before – toward those who refused to accept such an interpretation of religion, and the former regarded the latter as being “out of religion.”

Based on such unfounded interpretations, they rejected the narratives that diverged from theirs and engaged in takfiring all of those who either held different beliefs or belonged to a different population. They claim they are the only ones who have a right understanding of Islam, and that truth is in their possession in its entirety. Such a viewpoint is the essence of Takfirism; and in my mind, the current challenges in the region and the existing extremism are rooted in that viewpoint. As long as such an interpretation of religion was and is confined to a small group of individuals, these individuals could and can have their own beliefs.

Problem emerged when certain individuals, in possession of wealth and power, took up the task to spread these ignorant interpretations in Islamic countries far and near, and to impose them on people in poor nations through money and propaganda. This time around, the priority of this wealthy and powerful group was no more “religious purity;” rather, their activities were based on certain political goals and a number of short-sighted strategic calculations. Thus, unfortunately, individuals and groups that were susceptible to radical ideologies because of their social and economic conditions were lured.

On the other hand, while the majority of those who believe in Takfiri interpretations have always refrained from resorting to force to spread and enforce their beliefs, some of them took up arms, and in some cases, even rebelled against their own masters. It was exactly at this point where violent extremism was born.

The vicious cycle of foreign intervention, radicalism and regional instability

While it is necessary to investigate the roots of Daesh and Company in the historical trajectory of offering distorted interpretations of Islam, as described above, one should also pay heed to the important role of the bloody developments in Iraq in the past decade in the formation and growth of existing extremist groups, too. Political and military interventions in the Islamic world, particularly in the 2000s, caused many difficulties, provided fertile ground for extremist demagogues, allowed the most radical of them to dominate others and thus, the ground was paved for violent extremist groups to take shape.

Daesh is not a new phenomenon. There is now consensus that violent extremists have exploited the chaos in Iraq during the occupation of the country by the US. A group like Daesh, which feeds on turmoil and chaos, grew thanks to the instability and upheaval that emerged following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Extremists also found opportunities in the Syrian crisis and through the support they received from individuals, circles and governments in the region; they made up some fake cause, and turned into such monsters that they now sometimes even threaten their own masters and supporters.

Their call on the deprived youths in Arab countries following the relative failure of the “Arab Spring” and in Western countries enabled them to strengthen their ranks and grow rapidly. Military intervention and crude efforts aimed at the social engineering of Middle Eastern societies are reflective of the depth of illusions in the policy-making of the US and some other Western powers vis-à-vis the region. What was referred to as the “Greater Middle East Initiative,” and was aimed at the engineering of Middle Eastern societies along social and political lines with the ultimate goal of exporting “democracy” had provided the theoretical framework for military interventions.

This “initiative” prompted intense resistance in the region, and only managed to entail more extensive instability. Those who devised this plan were incapable of understanding that democracy can neither be imposed on a nation through brute force, nor can it take root in a society under the rule of an occupying military. The damage done to Iraq and the region while attempts were being made to enforce this illusory scheme has been so extensive and deep that years of endeavors to undo it have had little effect.

The objective of these policies, that were formed based on utter ignorance toward the innate dynamism of the region, was to impose on it a model completely alien to the region and in contradiction to the traditions, cultures and ways of life of native societies.

The continual instability that befell a number of societies in the region as a result of this process paved the ground for the empowerment of violent extremists, and caused a vicious cycle in which foreign occupation and radicalism fed one another, in such a way that extremists were enabled to exploit the social and cultural gaps that have been caused. Predicting such a scenario was not very difficult.

In a speech in the Security Council in February 2003, I said, “Today, the extent of instability in the region and uncertainty about the future in Iraq is beyond our imagination. Given the conditions of the Iraqi society, and in view of the situation in the entire region, ambiguities abound; and none of the sides can factor in these ambiguities in advance with any degree of certainty. But one outcome is almost certain, that extremism will massively benefit from this irresponsible adventurism in Iraq.”

Today, no one can deny that extremists and terrorists are way more powerful than what their demagogue masters could imagine in 2001, and are operating in more areas in the Middle East.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

11.Aug.2015

Hits: 2131

UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population.  Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.

The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002.  He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said. 

From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.

This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia.  “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.

THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.

Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.

Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”

So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.

BEGGING THE QUESTION

There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.

It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.

There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.

THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN

Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.

Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.

Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.

“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.

THE SHEKAU FILES

The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.

Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.

“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.

“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”

LAST WORD

When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”

This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

08.Aug.2015

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UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population.  Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.

The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002.  He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said. 

From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.

This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia.  “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.

THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.

Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.

Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”

So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.

BEGGING THE QUESTION

There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.

It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.

There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.

THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN

Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.

Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.

Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.

“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.

THE SHEKAU FILES

The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.

Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.

“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.

“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”

LAST WORD

When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”

This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

08.Aug.2015

Hits: 2298

UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population.  Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.

The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002.  He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said. 

From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.

This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia.  “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.

THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.

Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.

Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”

So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.

BEGGING THE QUESTION

There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.

It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.

There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.

THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN

Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.

Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.

Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.

“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.

THE SHEKAU FILES

The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.

Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.

“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.

“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”

LAST WORD

When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”

This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

08.Aug.2015

Hits: 3283

UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population.  Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.

The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002.  He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said. 

From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.

This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia.  “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.

THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.

Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.

Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”

So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.

BEGGING THE QUESTION

There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.

It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.

There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.

THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN

Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.

Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.

Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.

“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.

THE SHEKAU FILES

The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.

Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.

“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.

“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”

LAST WORD

When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”

This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.

Details

Ngwa Bertrand

08.Aug.2015

Hits: 4486