Politics
UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population. Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.
The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002. He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said.
From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.
This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia. “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.
THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM
Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.
Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.
Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.
WHAT HAPPENED NEXT
Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”
So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.
BEGGING THE QUESTION
There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.
It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.
There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.
THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN
Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.
Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.
Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.
“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.
THE SHEKAU FILES
The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.
Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.
“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.
“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”
LAST WORD
When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”
This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 3295
UCT religious studies expert Dr Andrea Brigaglia delves into the dilemma that is Boko Haram; an Islamist insurgent group, scorned by most Nigerians and controlling an area half the size of KwaZulu-Natal, which has managed to sow terror among a 170-million-strong population. Not everyone is aware that the name Boko Haram is actually taken from the Hausa language, widely spoken in Nigeria, and an expression of the disdain in which the group is held in large parts of the country.
The group’s official designation is Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (Arabic for the ‘Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the Armed Struggle, according to the method of Salaf’). AS DJ, as the name is sometimes contracted, was spawned when Mohammed Yusuf, a Salafi activist, issued a fatwa (or edict) in 2002. He declared it impermissible (haram) for Muslims to attend public school (boko) or to work for the government. This led to Nigerian Muslims mockingly dubbing the group Boko Haram. “Global Western media translate this to ‘Western education is a sin’, or ‘Western education is haram’, but I would rather translate it as ‘no to public school’, because I want to stress the political significance of the fatwa, the religious ruling that is the root of this nickname,” Brigaglia said.
From its beginning as a nickname to satirise a movement which Muslims perceived to be a fringe and insignificant voice in the public arena of Islam in the country, he added, it was taken up in a complex way in the non-Muslim Nigerian public arena as a symbol of what Islam stood for.
This (mis)appropriation of the name Boko Haram served to reinforce notions of Islam being ‘backward’ in some sectors of the Nigerian public, said Brigaglia. “For Muslims, it was a way of creating distance from the movement. For non-Muslims, it was a way of labelling Islam, and that’s what made the nickname so popular.” This distance continues today. Declaring one’s allegiance to Boko Haram in Nigerian Muslim circles is akin to signing one’s own death warrant, Brigaglia said.
THE REAL GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM
Boko Haram appeared between 2002 and 2009 as a fringe Islamist movement in Borno State in Nigeria. It was part of a broader network of Islamist movements, and broke off from a mainstream Salafi sect in 2002. “We use the term ‘Islamist’ as a synonym for ‘political Islam’, those movements that are making statements in the public sphere for an increased application of Islamic law and increasing participation of Islamic movements in politics,” Brigaglia explained.
Brigaglia said he preferred the term ‘phenomenon’ to ‘movement’, because the group’s evolution was so riddled with inconsistencies and counter-narratives that scholars were struggling to pin down a linear creation story. Between 2002 and 2004, Muhammad Yusuf broke away from mainstream Salafi leadership and declared it impossible to have Shari’ah courts in a non-Islamic state. “It is here that we have the real genesis of what we call Boko Haram as an independent movement,” Brigaglia said.
Boko Haram had been involved in sporadic shoot-outs with police, and attacked beer parlours and brothels after 2002; but 2007 witnessed their first real high-profile action. This was the murder of the most popular Islamist leader in Nigeria, Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during morning prayers, after he had spoken at length against the fatwa around schools and government work and questioned its motives and backing. It was now widely accepted that Mohammed Yusuf ordered the murder to be carried out, by a machine-gun-toting commando. “It really shocked the Nigerian public,” said Brigaglia, explaining that this was the first time a religious leader had been killed in a mosque while leading prayer.
WHAT HAPPENED NEXT
Boko Haram was crushed by the Nigerian state during 2009’s Operation Flush, under then-president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Not only was the movement forced into operating as underground militias, but its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed – not in fighting, but in police custody; as was his close ally, Alhaji Buji Foi. “Why? Was there am attempt to silence him because he had information about what was behind the genesis of his movement?” Brigaglia asked. “It’s a question Nigerians have been asking since 2009.” In 2010, Boko Haram reappeared, this time as a terrorist network with a modus operandi that relied heavily on bombings. “In 2010, the supposed second-in-command of the founder of the movement now reappears with some videos in which he threatens Nigeria, which nobody takes seriously at first,” Brigaglia said. “These threats realised themselves when they attacked, first, the UN headquarters, in 2010; and there were a series of attacks in 2010, including attacks on churches and others.”
So by now, it was an underground network of people operating from a hide-out between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders, from the remains of what used to be Boko Haram. Boko Haram began murdering civilians and kidnapping children en masse in 2014, which attracted widespread public condemnation. Girls were kidnapped to become sex slaves, and boys were kidnapped to be trained as militiamen, Brigaglia said. A horrific yet telling development was that most of the suicide bombers Boko Haram have used were young girls. This gruesome anomaly showed that even 12 years later, the movement was still struggling to infiltrate the psyche of its most logical ‘target market’: young men. Since March 2015, Boko Haram appears to have retreated from the Sambisa Forest, one of its strongholds.
BEGGING THE QUESTION
There are myriad curiosities that raise flags about Boko Haram’s place in global geo-politics, Brigaglia pointed out. Take the question of funding, for instance. While Boko Haram’s income is supplemented by ransoms from kidnapping, Brigaglia noted the “very ambiguous role” of a London-based Saudi NGO called Al-Muntada Islamic Trust. This very wealthy organisation has played a complex and clouded role, said Brigaglia. It sponsors the very Islamist networks that Boko Haram has attacked, but there are allegations of the NGO sponsoring Boko Haram, too.
It is also curious that Boko Haram became flush with cash soon after a state of emergency was declared in the states in which it operates. Then, in late 2013, an Australian negotiator claimed to have made direct contact with the group. His report mentioned two sources of funding: Ali Modu Sheriff, Borno State governor from 2003, and General Ihejirika, Nigeria’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2010 to 2014.
There was no concrete evidence linking these two, Brigaglia stressed, but added that Nigerians were frightened by the thought that Boko Haram might have had support from within political structures. To add a touch of paradox, Yusuf – whose original edict outlawed working for the government – had strong ties to Sheriff during his tenure as governor. So close was their relationship that Sheriff had appointed Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources.
THE MYSTERIES DEEPEN
Brigaglia noted two recent coincidences about the timing of Boko Haram’s apparent retreat in 2015. One was that it preceded the Nigerian presidential elections, in which Muhammad Buhari was voted into office. It also coincided with talks started by the Nigerian and Chad governments in August 2014 over the common Boko Haram threat, but possibly also over the exploitation of oil reserves shared by the two countries.
Oil had oozed into the picture earlier, too, said Brigaglia. Shortly before Boko Haram started operating as a forest-based militia, a massive oil reserve was discovered in Borno State. This deposit was shared by neighbouring states Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This anomaly should flag the possibility of the other forces operating in the area, said Brigaglia.
Such geo-political uncertainties also arose from US AFRICOM’s launch in 2006. This was a massive military operation, with the US setting up bases across the Sahel. Unlike its neighbours, Nigeria resisted advances for a US military base within its borders.
“I’m not saying that Boko Haram is a creation of foreign intelligence. I’m pointing to the idea that there is something going on geo-politically. It might be the US; it might be the US’s enemies that are interested in putting their foot in the country. It’s not very clear what’s happening,” he added.
THE SHEKAU FILES
The road to unmasking Boko Haram is potholed with discontinuities, said Brigaglia, pointing to a number of examples where conspiracy theories about the group’s inner workings and relationships with local and global geopolitics had been allowed to take root.
Because Boko Haram was such a “mysterious object”, it was often difficult to dislodge these conspiracy theories from the psyche of Nigerians. The death of Abubakar Shekau, the man who assumed Boko Haram leadership after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, was fertile ground for such conspiracies.
“Nigerian intelligence claimed to have killed Abubakar Shekau in August 2013,” said Brigaglia, yet a man claiming to be Shekau has continued to appear on Boko Haram videos after August 2013. Yet; in the videos released before and after 2013 he seems to be portrayed by two different men.
“So, who is the leader of Boko Haram since 2013? What has been happening to the leadership of 2013? And who are the different hands that have started to manipulate [the situation]?”
LAST WORD
When studying the genesis and evolution of Boko Haram, one is left with perplexity rather than certainty, Brigaglia concluded. “The history of Boko Haram over the last 13 years … would suggest that the pattern here is not of radicalisation, but rather a pattern of gradual penetration in Nigeria of a very complex, multi-layered set of regional and global interests.”
This article originally appeared in the University of Cape Town's publication Monday Monthly.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 4500
On the 4th of June 2015 and following Decision No. 00015 / NCC, the National Communication Council, NCC headed by veteran Anglophone Cameroon journalist, Peter Essoka in his dual capacity as vice president and "acting president" announced the suspension of some media organizations in Cameroon including some journalists. The popular pan-African television channel was banned from broadcasting for a period of one month while two of its journalists: Juliana Magne Tadda and Bashir Ladan were suspended for six-months.
Some few days after the Peter Essoka-NCC sanctions were made public,a senior official at African Media lampooned the decision, claiming CRTV and Canal 2 cannot compete in the market place of ideas and were using Peter Esoka and his CPDM acolytes to stifle free speech and freedom of press. The pan African TV official Mr. Albert Patrick Eya'a observed that his media organization will continue business as usual until "it receives the suspension letter." The National Communication Council made its decision on June the 4th 2015 as earlier stated but it was only on Thursday the 6th of August 2015 that a man call Sub Prefect of Yaounde II decided to shut down the station.
Peter Essoka, echoed the view that the role of the board was to ensure the profession's ethics. The honorary minister of communication as he is now being referred to was quoted recently as saying "The sub-prefect of Yaoundé II has done his work and the television building is now sealed." But just last night and as we write, the TV channel is going on with business and broadcasting more than ever before including a 24 hours news coverage. So, who now is fooling who here?
The reasons for the penalty imposed on African Media in the month of June, ranges from plain fiction to the most absurd. The members of the National Communication Council noted a recurrence of professional blunders on Pan-African television, revealed Mr. Essoka and guests on the channel were accused of uttering unjustified accusations and hate speech intended to harm the image and hard earn reputation of highly placed Cameroon government officials, foreign institutions and countries.
So, after more than two months, Hon. Peter Essoka is now satisfied that the doors of a French Cameroun television channel has been sealed by a retired Anglophone journalist. Great achievement for the Southern Cameroons National Council. The facilities of the Africa Media under the direct supervision of Police Commissioner Evelyn Ngoe Besumbu accompanied by some elements of her unit on the instructions of the sub-prefect of the district of Yaoundé II and in the presence of Gustave Sing, the Director of Africa Media "closed" the building while broadcasting was still going on inside. This is the journalism and its ethics that Peter Essoka brought from the US to Cameroon with his English With A Difference. We of this publication are saying that the gentleman needs rest.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 2825
On the 4th of June 2015 and following Decision No. 00015 / NCC, the National Communication Council, NCC headed by veteran Anglophone Cameroon journalist, Peter Essoka in his dual capacity as vice president and "acting president" announced the suspension of some media organizations in Cameroon including some journalists. The popular pan-African television channel was banned from broadcasting for a period of one month while two of its journalists: Juliana Magne Tadda and Bashir Ladan were suspended for six-months.
Some few days after the Peter Essoka-NCC sanctions were made public,a senior official at African Media lampooned the decision, claiming CRTV and Canal 2 cannot compete in the market place of ideas and were using Peter Esoka and his CPDM acolytes to stifle free speech and freedom of press. The pan African TV official Mr. Albert Patrick Eya'a observed that his media organization will continue business as usual until "it receives the suspension letter." The National Communication Council made its decision on June the 4th 2015 as earlier stated but it was only on Thursday the 6th of August 2015 that a man call Sub Prefect of Yaounde II decided to shut down the station.
Peter Essoka, echoed the view that the role of the board was to ensure the profession's ethics. The honorary minister of communication as he is now being referred to was quoted recently as saying "The sub-prefect of Yaoundé II has done his work and the television building is now sealed." But just last night and as we write, the TV channel is going on with business and broadcasting more than ever before including a 24 hours news coverage. So, who now is fooling who here?
The reasons for the penalty imposed on African Media in the month of June, ranges from plain fiction to the most absurd. The members of the National Communication Council noted a recurrence of professional blunders on Pan-African television, revealed Mr. Essoka and guests on the channel were accused of uttering unjustified accusations and hate speech intended to harm the image and hard earn reputation of highly placed Cameroon government officials, foreign institutions and countries.
So, after more than two months, Hon. Peter Essoka is now satisfied that the doors of a French Cameroun television channel has been sealed by a retired Anglophone journalist. Great achievement for the Southern Cameroons National Council. The facilities of the Africa Media under the direct supervision of Police Commissioner Evelyn Ngoe Besumbu accompanied by some elements of her unit on the instructions of the sub-prefect of the district of Yaoundé II and in the presence of Gustave Sing, the Director of Africa Media "closed" the building while broadcasting was still going on inside. This is the journalism and its ethics that Peter Essoka brought from the US to Cameroon with his English With A Difference. We of this publication are saying that the gentleman needs rest.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 2198
On the 4th of June 2015 and following Decision No. 00015 / NCC, the National Communication Council, NCC headed by veteran Anglophone Cameroon journalist, Peter Essoka in his dual capacity as vice president and "acting president" announced the suspension of some media organizations in Cameroon including some journalists. The popular pan-African television channel was banned from broadcasting for a period of one month while two of its journalists: Juliana Magne Tadda and Bashir Ladan were suspended for six-months.
Some few days after the Peter Essoka-NCC sanctions were made public,a senior official at African Media lampooned the decision, claiming CRTV and Canal 2 cannot compete in the market place of ideas and were using Peter Esoka and his CPDM acolytes to stifle free speech and freedom of press. The pan African TV official Mr. Albert Patrick Eya'a observed that his media organization will continue business as usual until "it receives the suspension letter." The National Communication Council made its decision on June the 4th 2015 as earlier stated but it was only on Thursday the 6th of August 2015 that a man call Sub Prefect of Yaounde II decided to shut down the station.
Peter Essoka, echoed the view that the role of the board was to ensure the profession's ethics. The honorary minister of communication as he is now being referred to was quoted recently as saying "The sub-prefect of Yaoundé II has done his work and the television building is now sealed." But just last night and as we write, the TV channel is going on with business and broadcasting more than ever before including a 24 hours news coverage. So, who now is fooling who here?
The reasons for the penalty imposed on African Media in the month of June, ranges from plain fiction to the most absurd. The members of the National Communication Council noted a recurrence of professional blunders on Pan-African television, revealed Mr. Essoka and guests on the channel were accused of uttering unjustified accusations and hate speech intended to harm the image and hard earn reputation of highly placed Cameroon government officials, foreign institutions and countries.
So, after more than two months, Hon. Peter Essoka is now satisfied that the doors of a French Cameroun television channel has been sealed by a retired Anglophone journalist. Great achievement for the Southern Cameroons National Council. The facilities of the Africa Media under the direct supervision of Police Commissioner Evelyn Ngoe Besumbu accompanied by some elements of her unit on the instructions of the sub-prefect of the district of Yaoundé II and in the presence of Gustave Sing, the Director of Africa Media "closed" the building while broadcasting was still going on inside. This is the journalism and its ethics that Peter Essoka brought from the US to Cameroon with his English With A Difference. We of this publication are saying that the gentleman needs rest.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 2104
Members of the Takfiri Boko Haram militant group have fatally shot nine people and set a number of houses ablaze after they stormed a village in Nigeria’s crisis-stricken northeastern state of Yobe. Witnesses said dozens of Boko Haram militants attacked the village of Tadagara at around 10:30 p.m. local time (2130 GMT) on Wednesday, looting thatch-roofed mud homes and shops before setting them on fire. "Boko Haram gunmen came on motorcycles and opened fire on the village after we had retired for the night and killed nine residents," Tadagara villager, Shuaibu Nuhu, said. "We fled into the bush from where we saw fire erupting from our homes as the gunmen set them alight after looting them," he added.
Tadagara residents said the Takfiri militants stayed in the village until dawn, when heavy rain stopped, and moved to the neighboring Dunbulwa village afterwards. "We luckily left the village as soon as we heard Boko Haram gunmen were on the attack in Tadagara, which was why they found the village empty," Dunbulwa resident, Sani Mai-Masara, said, adding, "They carted away food and jerrycans of fuel. They then set fire to our homes." The developments came only three days after the terrorists killed 13 people in Nigeria’s northeastern village of Malari. The attack also left 27 more people injured.Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has pledged to smash Boko Haram. A new 8,700-strong multinational force made up of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin is being set up in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, to tackle the terrorists.
Since the beginning of Boko Haram’s bloody militancy in 2009, at least 15,000 people have been killed and 1.5 million others displaced due to the violence perpetrated by the group, whose name means “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language, the most commonly-spoken language in Nigeria.
- Details
- Ngwa Bertrand
- Hits: 1991
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# Paul Biya and his regime
Explore the political landscape of Cameroon under the rule of Paul Biya, the longest-serving president in Africa who has been in power since 1982. Our Paul Biya and his regime section examines the policies, actions, and controversies of his government, as well as the opposition movements, civil society groups, and international actors that challenge or support his leadership. You'll also find profiles, interviews, and opinions on the key figures and events that shape the political dynamics of Cameroon.
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